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Philosophy, Literature, and Laughter:  Notes on an Ontology of the Moment 
         
        Lawrence Kimmel 
        Trinity University 
 
 There is an initial difficulty which merits acknowledgment at the outset of this 
inquiry.  In philosophy, all categories are weighted toward reflection and away from 
spontaneity.  It is hard to envision a philosophy of laughter, notwithstanding 
Bergson's familiar efforts to categorize the comic, or Nietzsche's provocations 
lauding caprice.  Philosophical discourse has been solidly and traditionally anchored 
in eternal concerns far from the madding eruption of laughter--the sound of frolic 
signifying nothing.  The characteristic philosophical disdain for, and obsession with 
escape from:  the momentary, the pleasurable, the distraction of the body and 
temptations of the senses, the seduction of, and abandonment to the embrace of, 
emotion--all of this argues against any profitable inquiry into the domain of laughter 
. 
 Literature is a more promising resource for the expression and understanding 
of laughter.  Even though its bias and signifying depth may be anchored to tragic 
drama, literature embraces affirmation in all its forms, including the diversities 
which laughter lends.   Fiction takes into itself and makes its own whatever issues 
from the surrounding discourse of life.  Literature, in this instance, and in this way, 
has an advantage over critical philosophy which has a traditional stake in the serious 
leverage of logic rather  than in the license or allowance of levity.  Philosophy may 
find it a useful exercise, for example, to outline those conditions under which 
laughter is inappropriate, in which sensibility or humanity is properly offended, and 
thus try to legislate the moral boundaries which laughter must observe.  Although 
one can imagine philosophy producing  an aesthetic or ethical commentary on the 
use and abuse of laughter, laughter remains an unlikely category for significant 
philosophical attention.   
 What might at first appear an exception to this is the occasional humor that 
finds a home in discourse--invariably a species of intellectual and didactic humor--
which sustains a critical edge:  in the irony of Socrates, the satire of Swift, the 
parodies of Voltaire, or more recently in Wittgenstein, where the lurking humor 
implicit in the play of grammatical jokes is designed to display the nonsense 
attending some misleading analogy at the heart of a philosophical thesis.  But 
laughter is a different matter entirely.  One can recall in Aristotle, and then in 
2 
 
Epicurean and Stoic writing, a focused concern to counsel against the ugly 
contortions and bad form of the unbridled in all its manifestations, particularly in the 
indulgent exuberance and public display of laughter.  Laughter in its unstructured 
freedom has seemed alien and antithetical to the studied discipline which constitutes 
philosophy. 
 
On the Nature of Laughter 
 It still seems possible and meaningful to attempt something of an account of 
laughter, relevant to Socrates' founding paradigm in the pursuit of wisdom--the 
discovery of how one is to live well.  A life of laughter may be a reductio ad absurdum  
of a hedonism gone berserk, but the occasion of laughter may also be of some 
consequence in understanding human life.  To that end, we may make a few 
tentative notes toward an ontology of laughter:  what is the name and nature of this 
utterly human thing? 
  Whatever else it may or may not be, laughter is manifestly a release, however 
brief, from time, from law, from obligation, from sense and sensibility, from suffering 
and death, indeed from the felt  burdens of life which are the normal calling  and 
normative substance of philosophical analysis.  Even Nietzsche’s enthusiasm toward 
whatever is new and “life furthering” contains the reminder that it is only after long 
and arduous denial and restrained conformity over an extended period of time that a 
discipline and knowledge emerges sufficient to accomplish whatever is "higher" in 
culture, art, and science.  Fortunately, Nietzsche's thought is developmental, and he 
follows the above declarations of the tedium of cultural obedience with the reminder 
of the eventual and pressing need for creative release from the burdens of the 
cultural past.   The congenital problem of modern philosophers is that they are born 
late, born old, born epigoni with the clutter of centuries of facts and assurances about 
what is so, what ought to be done, and how.   Therefore an imperative task develops 
for  a new generation which must find and fashion a break point of freedom from 
this constraint, must develop an ethics of "caprice".  Nietzsche does not quite, but 
might well, remark that what is necessary in the present age is the liberating abandon 
of laughter. 
 It may be instructive at this juncture to follow the logic of Nietzsche's familiar 
metaphor of "the three metamorphoses of the spirit" in which Man (the new and 
creative thinker) must first become a camel, then a lion, and finally a child.  The 
cultural animal must first take on and bear the weight of the wisdom which 
constitutes his past, must then be transformed into that being capable of rejecting 
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wisdom and of affirming his own vision, and then be transformed one final time into 
the creative being of the child.  The telos of this metamorphosis is a being who is not 
shackled with all the truths and prohibitions which informed those who are no 
longer alive.  Nor is the child saddled with the negative courage of strength that was 
needed to reject the received truth of the revered orthodoxies.  
  Nietzsche's forceful allegory will at least indicate the direction I intend to take 
the following remarks on the cultural imperative and philosophical point of laughter.  
His metaphor of moments in the creative transformation of both person and peoples 
registers the fact that the rivers we cross are never the same, that each new day 
brings its own needs, and the need of its own truths.  How is laughter involved in 
this?  It begins in the sweeping release from all that has preceded, from everything 
that has built up into whatever constrains and restrains:  the force of reason and 
logic, the binding morality of experience and tradition, the sacred sense of that for 
which parents and patriots have lived and died.  Laughter is a sudden mode which 
cleans the slate--golden age or fretted future disappear in the moment. 
 
Theories 
 As a phenomenon, laughter is notoriously difficult to explain--it resists the 
clear and insistent boundaries of theory.  There seems to be nothing at which human 
beings do not laugh, no one thing at which they all do laugh, and nothing appears 
common in those things which by common consent provoke the peal of  laughter.  
Hence the cause of laughter, apart from the mechanics and dynamics of a 
biochemical  trigger, remains a puzzle, if not a mystery.  There exists a long history of 
attempts to give reasons for laughter;  however, the general consensus of this history-
-the logic of laughter summerized, for example, in D. Monro’s The Argument of 
Laughter  (Notre Dame 1963)--is that laughter is best and most easily understood as a 
release from restraint.   This "universal” constant holds true in the diverse literature 
from Aristotle to Freud, with variations mainly depending on which side of the 
laughter one stands.  These discoveries of theory, however, seem to add little to the 
intuitions and experience of popular conception and opinion.   
 The purest form and expression of laughter--in its spontaneity-- comes to 
presence in the absence of any intent, where laughter is not directed or calculated to 
humiliate, censor, or correct, is not an act of callous rejection, cruelty, or 
accommodation.   A great deal depends, in such cases, on which side of the butt of 
the laughter one resides:  laugh-er or laugh-ee.  The present inquiry is designed to 
investigate the possible philosophical import of laughter free from such extraneous 
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social or moral concerns.  I will speak only to and about that laughter which is simple 
and 'innocent', or at least uncontrived and non-directed, which has no motive 
ulterior to the moment and occasion.  I am aware that there is likely no empirical rule 
for deciding this in any particular case;  I am interested only in the conceptual logic 
of the principle involved. 
 We do know something of the importance of innocent laughter to the health 
and longevity of individual life.  A person who laughs (for whom laughter is an ever 
present possibility and frequent exercise in spontaneity) as a rule has less illness, 
physical or mental--but then, so do symphony conductors, and, for all I know, shoe 
salespersons.  Facticity will not settle the issue. If laughter is intimately connected to 
health, and so to Plato's portrait of the good life, and to happiness, Aristotle's telos of 
human activity and well being, then we might well investigate this positive aspect 
and activity of laughter, not as release, merely, but as affirmation.  We thus attain a 
positive and negative definition of laughter analogous to Kant's logical requirements 
of freedom from..and freedom for...  If the arche of philosophy is the liberating task of 
a free and fully lived existence, and the telos of human activity is the spirit of its 
integration, where does laughter fit in?  Given the admitted disjunction between 
levity and leverage discussed in the first part of this paper, it will not be an easy fit.  
But at some level the cultivation of life and the life of culture begin and end in the 
simple affirmation of the moment. Nietzsche somewhere declares that it is in the 
laughter of the gods that we imagine existence at its most free and real:  laughter 
which overflows the boundaries of past and future, full throated sounds of 
privileged beings released from time and death, the very echos of which fill the 
moment to eternity.  It is in laughter that we are most like the gods (those gods of the 
Greeks in which Nietzsche found so much celebration of life);  it is in the capacity for 
laughter, and the sharing of that possibility, affirming existence, that gods and men 
are of one race. 
 In the concluding chapters of his Encyclopedia, Hegel set out the categories of 
the highest expression of the wholeness of ideal existence of which the (Absolute) 
Mind is capable:  the works of Art, of Religion, and of Philosophy.  In these workings 
of the Geist or Spirit the defining character of aesthesos, ekstasis, and sophia is formed.  
In these three culminating moments, the dialectic of existence is made whole:  
philosophical wisdom(sophia)  is the artistic integration and realization of sensuous 
apprehension (aesthesos) , and the ecstatic revelation of religious truth (ekstasis). This 
view of philosophy is the ideal recognition that wisdom is a dialectical product of the 
aesthetic and the ecstatic, of the sensuous and the spiritual.  Laughter, if we are to 
5 
 
locate it as a category and activity affirming existence, must partake of and celebrate 
both the sensuous and the spiritual;  it must be a moment of convergence of the two, 
and in that way constitute an essential aspect of philosophy. 
 
The Paradox of Laughter and Existence 
 The trick to understanding laughter may be to discover depth in the surface of 
things.  It is common enough to acknowledge that in the beginning is the end, the 
blossom is in the seed, the mighty oak in the acorn gathered into the hand of a child.   
Arche  and telos  converge in existence.  Put another way, in nature there is neither 
beginning nor end, no sharp edges of the discrete, of individuation.  In the cultural 
activity of the arts, there is a similar phenomenon:  tragic drama gives expression to 
the recognition that in pain there is beauty.  In life as in literature, it is equally true 
that in laughter there is sorrow.  The tragic and the comic both recognize and 
acknowledge that, in tears or laughter, this, too, shall pass and be forgotten like the 
rest.  There is no possessing here, no conserving or hoarding;  laughter can be no 
one’s property, tears belong to no one’s destiny.  In nature there are no oppositions, 
and no necessary associations:  if pain is inevitable, suffering is not.  One often finds, 
in the critique of hedonism, reminders that even pain and pleasure are not exclusive 
in their opposition, nor comparable in their kind.   
 The same point can be made through an analysis of the dysanalogous 
complexities of happiness and pleasure.  If pleasure is a sensation, happiness is better 
understood, in contrast, as an emotion, each marking a different level and domain of 
human experience.  But we can as easily point out that if pain is a sensation 
invariably locatable (the pain is sharp or deep, in my elbow or my lower back), 
pleasure is not in this way even a sensation.  Moreover, as Aristotle already made 
clear, happiness is best understood as a comprehensive human activity, not a state or 
emotion, and is certainly not exclusive of sorrow or pain.  Even if we stay within the 
common boundaries of psychological analysis, the phenomenon of pleasure is at root 
a release from tension built up in the organism.  Hence the pleasure of eating or of 
sex, however refined by the Epicurean aesthete, is only a release from the pangs of  
hunger or the craving of desire.  The irony of hedonism is that the delight of pleasure 
is purchased by the prior pursuit of pain.  This is problematic only for the 
pretensions of hedonism as an ethical theory.  In existence, however,  these are not 
two discrete movements requiring explanation, only the natural and integrated 
motion of a living organism. 
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 We have already noted the measure of depth which literature discovers in 
tragic drama.  In this fiction of terror and sorrow,  suffering reaches into the cultural 
depths of the of the human condition.  In exact parallel and counterpoint, and in 
resonance with this striven countenance of human frailty,  it is in the release of 
laughter that we descry and acknowledge the reality of existence itself.  It has 
sometimes seemed an embarrassment or offense that the actual performance of 
Greek tragic drama concluded not with the flawed self recognition and fall of the 
hero, but in fact followed the fragile and failed aspiration of human individuation 
with a robust celebration of life in the form of a Satyr play--the libidinous renewal 
and triumph of existence itself.  If the cultural pretensions of the human mind have 
been leveled, no less is the spiritual return to the time of the sacrificial god ensured.  
Terror and pity give way to laughter and celebration:  what cannot be made good or 
secure in the individual aspiration and heroic deeds of an individual is resolved 
through dissolution into the seasons and sharing cycles of life and death.  In the 
larger perspective of existence, there is no difference in kind between life and death, 
tears and laughter.  Thus at the heart of the tragic is laughter:  this is a paradox of 
depth and surface, life in death, that may equally mock the pretensions of a 
systematic philosophy that would explain everything, or of a skeptical philosophy 
that would dismiss everything.   Fortunately the creative core of fictive literature in 
tragic drama can express and celebrate this paradox without the obligation of 
overcoming it.  
 To give the logocentric devil its due, there has always existed within critical 
philosophy a germ of recognition that the secret of existence lies somewhere beyond 
the limits of cognitive reflection.  Such revelation is implicit or explicit from Plato to 
Wittgenstein.  In the Symposium (as it were, Plato’s satyr play), the disruptive revelry 
and boisterous entrance and character of Alcibiades is both an historical and 
dramatic reminder of the sound and fury of existence just beyond, held in fragile 
abeyance by the rational civility of Socratic discourse.  In similar concession, the 
positive recantations of Wittgenstein’s later Philosophical Investigations testify that 
once we have said all that can be said in science and philosophy and are so 
condemned to silence, there is more in the remaining silence than was dreamt of in 
the philosophies of the Timaeus or Tractatus.   
In any genuine contest between rationality, civility, and raw existence, laughter will 
prevail. 
 
Lessons in the Purity of Laughter:  Resolution of Paradox in the Moment 
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 The raveling I want to tether in an analysis of paradox is the idea that in 
laughter there is a purity of acceptance and unerring affirmation of existence.  There 
are brief moments in one’s life when and wherein existence resolves into laughter;  it 
is in those moments that we become whole, free, sane, and fully alive.  Beings in 
time, we are loosed from the fetters of time.  In the instant and instance of laughter, 
past and future vanishes, and nothing leads up to or away from this moment.  You 
did not plan it, you cannot preserve it.  As difficult as it is to stop a moment (“It goes 
by so fearfully fast,” said the King, “ you might as well try to stop a Bandersnatch”), 
so is it impossible to preserve laughter.  It materializes in the moment and dissolves, 
but it is a phenomenon of the moment which is complete in itself.  In its resolution, 
we become creatures of the moment, which is to say, paradoxically, of the eternal.  In 
this abrupt unfolding into eternity, time no longer holds us green or dying, no longer 
are we creatures lazing under the apple bough nor chained in song to the sea.  In the 
clarity of its arrest we are, as without assent, taken over with laughter--it bursts from 
our lungs as if it had been waiting, straining all the while.  We are no longer in 
control of the moment, and in that is our freedom.  This involition is the opposite of 
moral freedom: here there is no highly wrought autonomy, no achievement of the 
will or imperative of character;  rather, the practical will is obliterated in a paroxysm.  
 In an important sense, Kant was right in giving the sensuous universal its own 
separate Critique, and right also in his intuition that the conceptual meeting ground 
of pure and practical reason is the non-imperative acknowledgment of aesthetic 
“judgment”.  One can only express wonder that human sensibility converges in 
beauty, or again, in laughter. Plato’s Symposium is a hymn to the same order of 
recognition we find in Kant’s Third Critique.  In a very different vein Hegel, too, 
believes that it is in the capacity for tears and laughter that the Spirit in man finds the 
means to express itself in the world, and reciprocally, that the Spirit of the world 
finds expression in man.  Tears and laughter form a clear and final judgment of the 
significance of events in the world, form a response to the world that is the indelible 
imprint of the kind of existence we are..."how in action like an angel...in 
apprehension like a god...this paragon of animals...this quintessence of dust." 
 Freedom and necessity converge in laughter, compose the elements and 
occasion for it. Thought and feeling do not merely collapse into mind and mood, but 
mind and body collapse into spirit.  Laughter is not the synthesis of a dialectic of 
mediation, but a spontaneous emanation, a healing of the conceptual rifts of 
mind/body, thought/feeling, subject/object, self/other.  The philosophical 
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superstructure simply collapses, not under the weight of understanding or the 
leverage of analysis, but in the spontaneous combustion of existence. 
 
Laughter and the Ontology of the Moment 
 The central philosophical point to these notes is that the logic of laughter is 
such that the illusions of difference between mind and matter, self and other, 
appearance and reality, essence and existence--all the strain of dichotomized faculties 
and the angst of alienation and estrangement--simply collapse under their own 
weight.  The reflex of laughter explodes the reflect of mind.  The mirror of nature 
shatters and there is only existence, a spirit rejoicing in a moment of self-affirmation 
which excludes nothing. 
 I am aware that these are untimely notes, in a time which remains out of joint, 
out of sorts, and short on humor.  Neither am I confident there is something one can 
do with a piece of insightful outsidedness.  There is, in this understanding of the 
matter, no building block of theory which will bring laughter under the purview of 
anything else.  My sense about the philosophical placement of the category of 
laughter is more on the order of an obverse to a sensible response to evil.  In the 
latter case, we can do no more than bear witness to a fact, and acknowledge a primal 
reality which we may resist but not command or destroy.  Laughter is the other side 
of the conceptual coin:  we may joyfully celebrate and participate in the reality of the 
moment, and that is the end of it.  All the wisdom fashioned in life, literature, and 
philosophy awaken us to such moments, and we realize, in the wake of history and 
against the accumulated weight of the world, that these moments in which we are 
moved to tears and laughter are precious.  Moments do not hold life in bondage, but 
their occasion ensures that neither death nor evil hold dominion.  Such moments 
come as they will, and not as we will, although we are not powerless in pursuing 
possible situations in which these moments come to life.  In the end, it is not 
knowledge or goodness or beauty which justify existence:  it is only existence which 
can do that, and one of its arguments is the sound of laughter. 
 These notes are are offered as familiar versions not synoptic visions.  They are 
revisions of earlier versions gone awry.  It may be better, from the standpoint of 
experience, to regale with laughter (“A funny thing happened on the way to the 
library....”) than to review with grammar, but, for better or worse,  philosophy has no 
such modalities.   Even so, the topic of laughter may now look closer to certain 
features of philosophical orthodoxy.  Laughter occurs at the interstices between 
freedom and compulsion.  Like freedom, laughter loses its life in possession.  Like 
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love, laughter can only exist in its exercise;  also like love, it has a compelling nature 
of its own, and like loving, laughter can only exist in its own freedom.  The parity of 
laughter is fragile in a similar way:  the intrigue of intention, however well meant, 
will destroy it.  Alive, laughter is lightness and light carried on the air;  it cannot be 
bottled or boxed.  In point of contrast, the offense of sound track laughter spliced to 
the dead antics of taped television comedy comes to mind. 
 We have seen that it is not difficult to say from what restraints and constraints 
laughter frees us. We are released from the ancient demons of the human condition 
of contingency:   from time, troubles, plurality, scarcity, from the consciousness of 
pain and dying, from the responsibilities of promises and obligations, from the 
authority of truth and reason.   It is less easy to decide, and perhaps as pointless to 
try to determine, what it is we are released into through laughter, other than into the 
moment, which, complete in itself and however briefly, opens into eternity.  This is 
not, in any traditional sense, religious eternity--the fullness of time and the promised 
reward of the faithful.  On the other hand, the ontology of faith, as spiritual 
realization, may be understood in and as the fullness of the moment in which all else 
is reduced to nothingness.  In this sense the passion of faith and the release of 
laughter share something fundamental and essential to human existence.  The 
eternal, in either case, may be understood as the absolute fullness of the moment 
itself.  As such, laughter, no less than faith, embraces the whole of existence.   
 We have not quite come full circle in this essay so that we can claim a clearer 
idea of where we began.  Laughter is made no closer to the usual rational requisites 
of philosophical reflection or deliberation.  Laughter is, and remains, unquestionably 
an affair of the moment.  What I have tried to show is the vital consequence for 
existence which is met in a moment, so that the reality of a life may in some ways be 
measured in just such moments, no longer distanced from or placed in judgment of 
existence.  Philosophy, here, has less to teach than more to learn.   
 
 
